Development of trade blocs in an era of globalization: Proximity still matters by Aleid Brouwer & Tristan Kohl
Development of trade blocs in an era of
globalization: Proximity still matters
Tristan Kohl* and Aleid E. Brouwer**
*University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, P.O. Box. 800,
9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands, t.kohl@rug.nl.
**University of Groningen, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV
Groningen, The Netherlands, a.e.brouwer@rug.nl.
Version: 19 May 2011
FIRST, PRELIMINARY DRAFT. COMMENTS ARE WELCOME!
Abstract
This article investigates the development of international trade
blocs in the global economy for the period 1950-2005. We introduce a
new trade bloc variable based on the intramax hierarchical clustering
technique, which denes trade blocs on actual trade intensities and
not|as was previously done|by traditional geographic and political
factors, such as the division into a triad of economic regions based on
North America, the European Union and Japan. Nevertheless, the re-
sults of intramax hierarchical clustering indicate that actual trade ows
are very much inuenced by geographical, cultural, historical and po-
litical factors; after all, proximity matters. To explain how mechanisms
of globalization changed trade patterns over the last half century and
how, in the end, proximity is one of the most explanatory variables, we
apply multivariate analysis with gravity-equation based variables that
can be associated with the existence of trade clusters.
Keywords: International trade, proximity, trade clusters, intramax,
gravity model (JEL F13, F18, R11, R12).
1 Introduction
Geographic space can be dened by its administrative, economic, cultural,
historic, socio political and/or legal context. However, this does not strictly
mean that business and economic activities occur along the same lines. In
describing trade blocs, for example, economic studies typically divide space
1into regions that are based on geographic (e.g. continents) or political fac-
tors (e.g. nation states). But is there a way to identify trade blocs that are
independent of such factors? The answer is: Yes. And it is still geographi-
cally relevant, since trade among countries is imbalanced and inuenced by
changes in political and institutional factors, their (shared) history, colonial
ties language and culture. In other words: the centripetal and centrifugal
forces of regionalization and globalization (compare Andresen, 2009b).
Much has been written about the so-called \triad" of economic regions
based on North America, the European Union and Japan, which denes
trade blocs by traditional geographic and political factors. As Poon et al.
(2000) and Poon and Pandit (1996) show with trade data spanning 40 years,
this triad of economic regions is a myth, while the regionalization of nations
that trade more together within a cluster is reality (compare Glenn, 2008).
Poon et al. (2000) and Poon and Pandit (1996) nd that international trade
does increasingly focus on a few clustered regions, but nd no evidence for
a triad-based world economy. Interesting is the change in clusters and di-
rections of trade over the years. If one studies longitudinal data, the rst
impression is that trade and the direction of trade is not stable. How can
one investigate such uctuations and do these uctuations aect trade clus-
ters? Are there international trade clusters to be found and how stable are
they over time? How can possible dierences and shifts over time be ex-
plained? Contrary to Poon and Pandit (1996), we investigate a number of
variables|geographical, political, historical and cultural|that are associ-
ated with these trade clusters, and how they change over time. It needs to
be underlined that we only focus on aggregate merchandise trade ows, and
not foreign direct investment (FDI).
Summarizing, our main goal is to investigate the drivers of (geographi-
cal) clustering of trading nations into trade blocs. We do so by applying the
intramax clustering techniques to a dataset spanning 1950-2005. This is a
more elaborate dataset than used in previous research concerning trade clus-
ters. Moreover, we apply gravity-equation variables in a multivariate anal-
ysis (compare Frankel et al., 1995, 1996) to investigate why certain regions
trade with each other in larger (relative) trade volume than with other coun-
tries. Is geographical proximity the main determinant as Krugman (1991)
suggests, or do other factors contribute as well? We expect that, in addition
to geodesic distance, trade partners' gross domestic product (GDP), popula-
tion size, shared languages, shared colonial history, shared border(s), grade
of isolation (landlocked, island, common continent) and/or their involvement
in a common trade agreement can all be associated with the formation of
trade blocs.
The intramax technique is a hierarchical clustering method that is used
in spatial studies. It groups predened areas (districts, countries, etc.) based
on the level of interaction between them. For example, this technique is used
to gain a better understanding of urban regions and their catchment areas
2by using data on commuter ows. The resulting clusters are also known
as functional areas. In this study, the intramax method uses bilateral trade
data to identify functional trade blocs. Note that although an initial amount
of space is identied (i.e. countries), the intramax method does not require
neighboring countries to belong to the same trade bloc. Whether countries
belong to the same trade bloc strictly depends on bilateral trade ows, as
will be explained below.
The literature review is given in section 2, which elaborates on the issues
raised in the introduction. Section 3 explains the methodology and discusses
the choices made in instruments and data. Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 provides a discussion and draws conclusions.
2 Literature review
Our main goal is to investigate what drives (geographical) clustering of trad-
ing nations. The literature indicates that regionalization of nations is in-
creasing and very much a realistic division of economic spaces in the world
economy. Many studies (amongst others Poon, 1997a,b; Poon and Pandit,
1996; Poon et al., 2000; Glenn, 2008; MacLeod and Jones, 2007; Andresen,
2009a,b) indicate (geographical) clustering of nations due to forces of natural
and institutional regionalization.
2.1 Regionalization of trade clusters
Economic activities are increasingly occurring within supranational spaces
or regional states, which results in functionally interconnected transnational
spaces. The \space" in which trade takes place is dened by the ows of
economic activity, rather than by political boundaries (Glenn, 2008). Po-
litical boundaries can be identied either physically (e.g. by an ocean or
river) or as a (real or imagined) line in the sand that denes the boundary
of a nation, state, city or other jurisdiction, separating the rights and laws
of one from the other's rights and laws (Gregory et al., 2009). In this study,
we use political boundary as the division between the nation states. Emerg-
ing from economic activities, this \regional state" therefore comprises the
whole of two or more nation states, based on the outcome of global trade
and multinational activity (Poon and Pandit, 1996).
Due to intensifying forces of globalization in the 1990s, the number and
volume of linkages between countries has also been strengthened and forced
integration of otherwise spatially separate economic activities (Poon et al.,
2000). Glenn (2008) nds similar evidence for an increasing number of
countries to be more integrated into a common economic system. He de-
nes regionalization as follows: \...economic activity is becoming ever more
concentrated within clearly identiable geographical regions" (p. 80).
3Poon (1997b) argues that this regionalization of international trade is
said to be a \natural phenomenon". But in accordance with Frankel et al.
(1995), he also emphasizes that the governmental promotion of linkages be-
tween countries by joining preferential trading agreements (PTAs), such as
free trade areas and customs unions, can spur the natural process of re-
gionalization, especially if the main goal is to increase economic integration.
Frankel et al. (1995, 1996) reect that close historical and geographical ties
between the countries drive this \natural" process of regionalization. Poon
(1997a,b) adds, however, that very often regionalization happens without
these explicit aims or measures and underlines that regionalization of coun-
tries is often only driven by market forces. These \natural trading regions"
consist of countries with high trading intensities among each other due to ge-
ographical proximity, lower transaction costs and cultural anities creating
spatial biases (compare Frankel et al., 1995, 1996). The trade regions that
come forward from regionalization are the combination of two or more nation
states, based on economic activity, rather than political boundaries. It must
be underlined that this regionalization process based on trade diers signif-
icantly from closed trade blocs. The latter is formed basically by political
institutions and decisions, whereas the former reveals the workings of global
capital and markets (Poon and Pandit, 1996). Andresen (2009a) adds that
the trade clusters are not \forced" due to preferential trade agreements|
although they can have a positive inuence|this process is called regional-
ism.
2.2 Importance of distance
Now that we are in an era of globalization, an increasing number of coun-
tries has become integrated in the global economic system. Many named the
forces of globalization to indicate the \end of geography" (see, among oth-
ers, Greig, 2002; Friedman, 2005; Baldwin, 2006). This spurred the powerful
counterargument that \the world is not at" (for an excellent overview, see
Christopherson et al., 2008), which argues that globalization makes geodesic
distance sometimes less important, e.g. by the increase in mobile commu-
nication and introduction of the Internet, but with an increase in trade
in knowledge intensive sectors; distance, or proximity, is getting more im-
portant. Face-to-face contacts are necessary in the transfer of this specic
sectoral knowledge and consequently for trade (Dicken, 2007). This remains
important even with the change in decreased costs in accessing foreign mar-
kets (Andresen, 2009b). He argues that geographical or cultural distance
\still" play a role, and maybe even a growing one, for international trade
relationships. On one side regionalization and on the other side globaliza-
tion; both play part in determining international trade patterns (Michalak
and Gibb, 1997). When dening international trade as moving goods form
one place to another inuenced by special transfer costs (transport, taris,
4etc.), geographical distance obviously is important (Hanink and Cromley,
2005).
Most countries have a growing quantity of their national economic ac-
tivities in some sort of a \relationship" with a growing number of other
countries (Andresen, 2009a,b). Do these global ows of trade increase the
probability of regionalization with a larger number of countries? Are fewer
trade clusters the result of this growing number of relationships? Accord-
ing to Glenn (2008), the answer is \no". Even though trade might increase
at a global level, the distance to trade partners inuences the volume of
trade and therefore the regionalization processes. In a conceptual frame-
work, MacLeod and Jones (2007) agree that distance is the most dominant
determinant for generating economic regions, but underline the inuence of
culture, politics and history on relative distance (\spatial ows") as discon-
tinuous or strengthening forces. The territories (or economic regions rather)
that are created by these spatial ows have strong ties, but are not unbreak-
able, but rather victim to continuous \territorial restructuring" (p. 1182)
in a politically and economically turbulent world. Our study provides an
empirical application to this conceptual idea.
Poon et al. (2000) nd that international trade has organized around
fewer and fewer world regions since 1985, but nd no evidence for a triadi-
azation of the world economy. They do argue that forces of globalization
have led to the decrease in the number of trade regions they nd. The au-
thors nd that the changing shape and nature of trade clusters is largely
ascribed to continental lines and at the same time strengthened by FDI,
which does appear to have a \network" shape and does not need continuous
continental regions. Andresen (2009a) agrees with those ndings. Accord-
ing to Poon et al. (2000), the uctuation of trade clusters is \operated by
centrifugal and centripetal forces operating simultaneously, resulting in con-
stellations of relationship (e.g. trade clusters) where space is both sticky
(important) and uid (exible) at the same time" (p.440). Concluding, it
can be said that economic ows do not only follow absolute space, but they
are also led by relative distance, formed by historical ties, shared cultures
and (changing) political systems. Countries trade with \natural partners"
(Michalak and Gibb, 1997).
The importance of spatial structure was investigated by Poon and Pandit
(1996) in the process of regionalization. They nd, rather than a triad struc-
ture of global trade, evidence for six trade clusters focused around six core
market countries (the US, Germany, France, the UK and the former USSR),
underlining that these clusters are not geographically contiguous regions, but
\functional units", not dened by only geographical proximity, but more by
the volume of trade interactions. The functional regions described by the
authors are explained by the intensity of bilateral trade between the mem-
bers. The authors argue that \scale economies and large ecient markets
are instrumental in shaping emerging regional conguration" (p. 284), which
5is in accordance with the New Trade Theory. This evidence was indicated
by Michalak and Gibb (1997, p. 266) as a strong case for \regionalism as
one of the most inuential factors determining world-trade ow". Andresen
(2009a) nds that over time, trade clusters have fewer members of geograph-
ically closer countries. This is because the importance of shared past and
colonial ties is decreasing, while the importance of distance (as a proxy for
transportation costs) is increasing in importance. So, nations in trade clus-
ters do not need to be neighboring per se, as in shared borders, but close
geographical proximity does improve the chance of being in the same trade
cluster. In a case study on trade patterns of France, Lafourcade and Paluzie
(2010) nd with a gravity model that in the period 1978-2000, the trade of
France has changed, probably due to the European integration, especially
in the border regions. They nd that border regions of France trade on
average 73% more with neighboring countries than predicted by the gravity
norm, even when controlled for bilateral distance and origin and destination
specic characteristics. Similar results for the importance of proximity to
increasing trade intensication are found by Hanink and Cromley (2005).
They even claim that it matters not just between countries, but also within
nations. As Andresen (2009a,b) states, the arrangements of nations in eco-
nomic space originate from a trading network. The author argues that
trading networks are strongly inuenced by historical and political ties (see
also Lee and Park, 2005). Having historical similarities and political ties
decreases the relative distance between nations and increases the intensity
of trade between the involved countries. According to Andresen (2009a)'s
analysis, he nds signicant results of the inuence of historical ties until
1981 for regionalization, especially if the historical ties have led to a shared
institutional context. For example, a shared religious majority could create
similar cultures for nations, as Yamazaki (1996) nds that Christianity has
provided a unifying framework for Europe. Also other cultural ties, such as
language, can improve trade relationships, especially since a shared language
is often combined with historical colonial ties (Frankel et al., 1995; Lee and
Park, 2005).
Following the literature described above, we expect regionalism to be an
inuential factor in the volume of trade between nation states. We expect
that geographically close countries|in both absolute and relative terms|
have a higher probability of being in the same trade region, or trade bloc, as
we dene it. We expect this due to the inuence of shared past and colonial
ties, however, this eect is likely to have been stronger in the mid-1900s.
During the last few decades we expect an increase in the importance of
absolute distance, as a proxy for transportation costs. So, nations in trade
clusters do not need to be neighboring per se, as in shared borders, but close
geographical proximity does improve the chance of being in the same trade
cluster. Furthermore, we expect that next to geodesic distance, GDP, pop-
ulation, shared languages, shared colonial history, shared border(s), grade
6of isolation (landlocked, island, common continent) and/or being in a com-
mon trade agreement inuence the clustering of nations into \natural" trade
blocs. This paper identies such clusters and applies multivariate analysis
with gravity-equation based variables to investigate the inuence of those
variables on the chance for two nations to be in the same trade bloc.
3 Methodology
The outline of this section is as follows. First, trade clusters throughout
the global economy are identied for the period 1950-2005 using the intra-
max hierarchical clustering technique, as discussed in section 3.1. We then
explain the empirical model used to determine how geographical, cultural,
political and historical factors are associated with the development of these
trade blocs in section 3.2. Section 3.3 provides details on the underlying
data.
3.1 Intramax
The intramax hierarchical clustering technique identies functional areas us-
ing ow data and works as follows.1 First, all trade ow data are arranged
in a square contingency table, or an origin-destination matrix, for a given
year. The origins (exporting countries) are in rows, while the destinations
(importing, reporting countries) are in columns. The intramax algorithm
maximizes the proportional amount of within-group interaction while mini-
mizing the number of cross-boundary movements.
Masser and Brown (1975, p. 510) stress the importance of the size of the
ows and formulate an `objective function in terms of the dierences between
the observed and the expected probabilities that are associated with [the]
marginal [row and column] totals.' The objective function that is applied
is:
maxI = (aij   a
ij) + (aji   a
ji);i 6= j (1)
In applying this function, a transformed matrix is calculated which mea-
sures the largest total interactions between pairs of countries in excess of
the total of the expected values derived from row and column totals. The
expected value of each element is the product of the column sum times the
ratio of the row sum to the total interaction. For example, the expected
ow out of Country 2 to Country 1, a21, where aij is the element in row i
1We use the FlowMap software package to perform the intramax procedure. See http:
//flowmap.geog.uu.nl.
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Normalizing the ows such that n = 1 and a
ij = aiaj means that 'the
dierence between observed and expected values aij a
ij for the ow between
zone i and j may be taken as a measure of the extent to which the observed
ow exceeds (or falls below) the ow that would have been expected, simply
on the basis of the size of the row and column marginal totals' (Masser and
Brown, 1975, p. 512).
Based on this, the pair of countries with the highest absolute level of
interaction are merged and henceforth considered to belong to the same
functional area. Their interaction (i.e. cross-border trade) becomes intra-
zonal. This merger causes the matrix to be reduced by one column and one
row. The objective function can then be reapplied and the modied matrix
recalculated to yield the next pair of countries with the highest absolute
level of interaction. This procedure is repeated until the (n 1)th iteration
has been completed.
Our output is conveniently drawn in dendograms that show how coun-
tries have been clustered, based on the degree of intrazonal interaction. If
the degree of intrazonal interaction is 0%, each country is taken as its own
unique functional area. If this number is 100%, it means that all countries
have been merged into one and the same cluster.
At what degree of intrazonal interaction should a functional area be
identied? The literature does not provide a uniform answer. Some authors
draw the proverbial line at a level of clustering where homogeneity within a
cluster is lost (Goetgeluk, 2006)|but it is unclear how homogeneity should
then be dened. One way is by choosing clusters if there is a large increase
in the intra-zonal ows. However, a large increase in the intrazonal ows
during the fusion process does not generally indicate 'a merger of two rather
homogeneous zones'. Still, the most practical \stop criterion" is one that
uses the functional areas found \just before the high increase in intra-zonal
ows' (Goetgeluk, 2006, p. 11)|although some degree of freedom may need
to be maintained to identify realistic clusters. This approach is consistent
with ours, and recommended by the software developers.
For each year of output, we use the dendograms to determine if coun-
tries belong to the same functional area. Starting with 100% intrazonal
interaction where there is only one trade cluster, we consider the rst time
this cluster branches into smaller clusters, in practice 2. If a country-pair
belongs to the same trade cluster, it is assigned a 1 and otherwise 0. This
is the rst \split". We then look at how each of these clusters is subdivided
8into even smaller functional areas. This typically gives rise to 4 clusters.
Again, countries in the same cluster are assigned a 1 and otherwise 0. This
variable is the second split. The third split gives up to 8 clusters, and the
nal (fourth) split we consider gives up to 18 clusters. We do not break the
functional regions down beyond the fourth split because we observe large
increases in the intrazonal ows between functional areas between the third
and fourth or fourth and fth split. We therefore conclude that the third
and fourth splits yield the best representation of trade blocs in our dataset.
3.2 Trade bloc variables
The intramax hierarchical clustering technique has been used to determine
if country-pairs belong to the same trade bloc in a given year. But what
drives this trade bloc formation? This subsection discusses our modeling
strategy which is used to obtain insight into how geographical, cultural,
political and historical factors are associated with the trade blocs identied
by the intramax procedure. We estimate a probit model,
Pr(Bk = 1jX) = (X0) (3)
where B is a binary variable that is 1 if both countries in a dyad belong
to the same functional area after the kth split, as identied by the intramax
hierarchical clustering technique, and X is a vector of regressors, with:
X = ln(Distanceij) + ln(GDPijt) + ln(Populationijt)
+ Borderij + Landlockedij + Islandij + Languageij
+ Colonyij + ComColij + Sameij + PTAijt:
(4)
Subscript i (j) indicates the importing (exporting) country in year t.
The time-varying regressors include the average real GDP of both trade
partners, GDPijt, the dyad's average population Populationijt, and PTAijt
is a binary variable that is 1 if the country-pair has a preferential trade agree-
ment and 0 otherwise. The time-invariant regressors include the geographic
distance between countries i and j in kilometers, Distanceij, Borderij is a
binary variable that is 1 if the countries share a land border and 0 other-
wise, Landlockedij takes on the values 0, 1 or 2, depending on the number
of countries in the dyad that are landlocked, Islandij is 0, 1 or 2, indicating
the number of nations in the dyad that are islands, Languageij is a binary
variable that is 1 if the country-pair shares a common language and 0 other-
wise, Colonyij is a binary variable that is 1 if the country-pair has ever been
in a colonial relationship and 0 otherwise, ComColij is a binary variable
that is 1 if the country-pair has had a common colonizer after 1945, and
Sameij is a binary variable that is 1 if both countries were or are the same
country and 0 otherwise.
93.3 Data
Our panel dataset covers a maximum of 211 countries and contains ob-
servations for the period 1950-2005 in 5-year intervals. Table A1 lists the
countries included in the dataset. The panel is arranged by country-pair and
year, regardless of missing or zero values. Each country-pair is represented
twice, once as ij and once as ji. This is done because bilateral imports are
used as the dependent variable.
Bilateral trade data (imports c.i.f. and exports f.o.b. in US$ millions)
were obtained from IMF (1995, 2008). The dependent variable of choice is
bilateral imports. In case of missing values, the country's trade partner's
bilateral exports are used as a proxy of that country's bilateral imports. We
assume a 10 percent c.i.f. rate when exports are used to replace missing
imports. We obtain real trade by deating with the US Consumer Price
Index (All Consumer Goods, 1983-4 = 100) obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Data on GDP (in 1990 international dollars) were obtained from Mad-
dison (2007). Additional data were obtained from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (2007) using the GDP in 2000 international dollars
series, which was reconverted to be consistent with Maddison's data. Data
on population were also obtained from Maddison (2007). Population data
for 1948-49 were taken from World Bank (1951). As with the trade data,
GDP and population data were also converted to units.
Several variables were obtained from the CEPII Distance Database: sim-
ple geodesic distance (in kilometers), country size (in square kilometers),
whether countries share a common major/ocial language, a border, or are
part of the same continent, whether countries are islands or landlocked, and
details on their colonial history (CEPII, 2008). Details on countries' par-
ticipation in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) were obtained from Kohl
(2010). Note that these agreements can be both regional (e.g. European
Community, North American Free Trade Agreement) or interregional (e.g.
Canada-Costa Rica, US-Singapore). A complete list of PTAs included in
this study is provided in Table A2.
4 Results
This section provides two sets of results. Visual representations of the trade
clusters obtained by the intramax method are displayed in section 4.1. Re-
sults from our probit analyses are presented in section 4.2.
4.1 Trade blocs obtained from intramax
The trade clusters obtained from the intramax procedure are graphically
represented for the period 1950-2005 in Figure 1-7. Since the large number
10of clusters after the fourth \split" (as discussed in section 3.1) complicates
comparison and discussion, these gures show the trade blocs obtained after
the third split. For ease of comparison, each cluster is labeled as being
oriented towards the major economy (country) in that cluster.
Visual inspection of the trade clusters throughout the years indicates
that there is a decrease in the number of clusters over time. The stronger
geographical focus of the clusters over time becomes evident. While in the
1950s some clusters obviously have colonial ties (e.g. clusters that contain
African countries, India or Indonesia), in 2005 the clusters are much more
geographically continuous. Interesting to see is that the North and South
American clusters are much more stable over time in terms of the number
of countries and the trade bloc orientation. Most \turbulence" seems to
take place in Europe, Africa and Asia. It can be seen very clearly that the
importance of historical/colonial ties seems to fade away after the 1980s
(compare Head et al., 2010; Andresen, 2009a,b; Poon et al., 2000). Further-
more, no triadization is to be found by the intramax method. We do nd
clusters with a trade bloc orientation to the US, Japan and Germany in the
period 1950-2000, but in 2005 Japan disappears as a trade bloc orientation.
Furthermore, we nd strong evidence of other trade clusters next to the so-
called triad. Notable is that the Brazil, India, China, and Russia-oriented
clusters have been important for their regional economies for many decades,
though only since the past decade have they attracted more attention as
\emerging markets".
Figure 1: Trade bloc orientations in 1950.
4.2 Trade bloc variables
Estimates of the probit model specied in section 3.2 are provided in Table
1-2. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a country-pair
belongs to the same trade cluster, as identied by the intramax procedure
after the fourth \split". We use data on the fourth split because the model
t is, on average, 10 percentage points higher compared to estimates based
11Figure 2: Trade bloc orientations in 1960.
Figure 3: Trade bloc orientations in 1970.
Figure 4: Trade bloc orientations in 1980.
12Figure 5: Trade bloc orientations in 1990.
Figure 6: Trade bloc orientations in 2000.
Figure 7: Trade bloc orientations in 2005.
13on the third split. However, the results are very similar and available upon
request.
In Table 1, model (1) shows the probit estimates for the full sample.
The average marginal eects in (2) and marginal eects at the mean in (3)
are nearly identical. The average marginal eects for individual years are
shown in Table 2.2
(1) (2) (3)
Probit AME MEM
ln Distance -0.677*** -0.098*** -0.093***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
ln GDP -0.053*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
ln Population 0.115*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Border -0.195*** -0.025*** -0.023***
(0.024) (0.003) (0.002)
Landlocked
1 -0.036*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
2 -0.074*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.003)
Islands
1 0.127*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
2 0.524*** 0.093*** 0.094***
(0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
Language 0.197*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Colony 0.394*** 0.069*** 0.070***
(0.027) (0.006) (0.006)
Common Colonizer 0.277*** 0.045*** 0.044***
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Same Country 0.200*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.033) (0.006) (0.006)
PTA 0.455*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.004)






% Correctly specied 89.91
Pearson p-value 0.000
Notes: Probit estimates in (1), average marginal eects in (2)
and marginal eects at the mean in (3). Dependent variable:
B4. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coecients
marked  are signicant at the 1% level,  5% and  10%.
Table 1: Probit estimates for full sample, 1950-2005.
We nd that whether or not two countries belong to the same trade
cluster is very much inuenced by distance, both in absolute and relative
2We also estimate the marginal eects at the mean (omitted to save space), which we












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15terms, as we expected. Over the entire period (1950-2005) all variables
included in the estimations are of signicant inuence on the probability
of two countries belonging to the same trade bloc. The negative sign of
distance means that if the physical distance between two countries increases,
the probability of being in the same trade bloc declines. Furthermore, Table
1 reports that countries where the average GDP is higher (as a proxy for
purchasing power of the|extended|market) have a higher chance of being
in a trade cluster. A similar eect can be found for the shared population
of the two nations. If the country-pair has a higher average population,
which is a proxy for market size in potential customers, the chance of being
clustered increases.
With respect to the geographic controls, contiguity (having a common
border) is a complicated variable. Instinctively, the chance of sharing a
border should increase the chance of being in a cluster (compare Andresen,
2009a). However, the nations in our trade blocs are often in a cluster with
more than 16 nations, with which they obviously cannot all share a bor-
der. This has a negative bearing on the estimated parameter value. The
geographical position of countries or the set of countries also has a strong
inuence on the chance of being in a trade cluster. When one country of
the set is completely landlocked, this has a negative eect on the chance of
being clustered. Being landlocked means less access to sea ports and hence
an increase in transportations costs (compare Frankel et al., 1996). When
both countries in the dyad are landlocked, the chance of them being in a
trade cluster is even smaller. When a country is an island, or when both
countries in a dyad are islands, it positively aects the probability of being
in the same trade cluster. This has everything to do with the geographical
location of most of the island-nations in our dataset. Nation islands are
remote from most other countries and the nations closest to them are other
islands (consider, e.g. Caribbean and South-Pacic island groups). If both
countries are islands substantially increases the chance of being in the same
trade bloc.
With respect to cultural and historical variables we found the following.
Shared language (as a proxy for shared culture) has a positive eect on
the chance of being in a shared cluster, conrming the literature discussed.
When one of the two countries has been a colony of the other country in the
past (such as Senegal being colonized by France, Angola by Belgium, and
India by the United Kingdom), this is reected in a positive eect on the
chance of sharing a trade cluster. Similar eects are found for two countries
in a dyad that share the same former colonizer (such as Senegal and Nigeria
do with respect to France, and India and Myanmar (Burma) with respect
to the UK). Not unexpectedly, having a shared history, i.e. two countries
that used to be one nation state (such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia
or nations that used to constitute Yugoslavia), has direct positive eects on
being in the same trade cluster. The eect of sharing a preferential trade
16agreement is positive on being in a shared trade cluster. These results are
in line with the expectations form the literature review.
In Table 2, running AME estimates for similar variable on trade cluster,
but on 5 year periods, similar eects can be distinguished. The eect for
distance follows the two arguments as discussed in the literature. One can
see that over time rst (till 1975) distance has less impact on clustering, and
from 1990 onwards there is an increase in the distance eect again. First,
maybe due to globalization forces, proximity became less important, later
on the eect of need for personal information exchange might have made
proximity more important for countries to be in the same trade cluster. For
the average GDP, we nd rst that a higher average GDP has a lower chance
of getting two nations in the same cluster, while after 1975 the sign changes
and the higher average GDP increases the chance of being in the same clus-
ter. This might be explained by the changing \North-South" orientation of
trade (more market extension than cheap imports) (Poon and Pandit, 1996).
Similar eects are found for the average population. Until 1965, the aver-
age lower population size led to clustering of two nations, while afterwards
higher average population leads to a higher probability of clustering. This
might also be explained by market orientation of trade (Glenn, 2008; Poon
and Pandit, 1996).
With respect to the geographical control variables, we nd the following.
When there is a signicant border eect on clustering, its eect is negative.
As explained before, this has to do with the number of countries in a trade
bloc that do not share a border due to their geographic layout. Over time,
one can see that the border eect is rather small, if signicant at all. Being
landlocked does have similar eects for the shorter periods as for the whole
time-span. Especially when both countries are landlocked, we nd a negative
eect on being in the same cluster, due to increases in transportation costs.
The eect of one country being an island on being in the same trade cluster
is not very often signicant in the short time studies. When signicant, the
eect can be both positive and negative. This unclear evidence might be
inuenced by the fact that many islands were colonies in the past and trade
ows of the islands with other countries were mostly determined by who
was colonizing them (Glenn, 2008). When investigating the eect of both
countries being islands and the eect on being in the same trade clusters,
there is clear evidence that this positively aects the probability of being in
the same cluster.
As for the cultural and historical variables, for most time-periods con-
clusive evidence is found to conrm the outcomes from Table 1. With a few
(mostly not signicant) exceptions, sharing a language has a positive eect
on the chance of two countries being in the same cluster. Colonial ties with
one of the countries does keep a positive eect on the chance of being in the
same cluster, even though the intramax results indicate that colonial ties
get weaker and/or become less important over time (compare Head et al.,
172010). The colonial eect might be overtaken by shared language, shared
background and institutional similarities (compare Glenn, 2008; Andresen,
2009b), but history does not change, so the eect might be indirectly found
back in colonial ties. The results for common colonizer are similar to the
long time-span estimations. The eect of two countries being one country
in the past does not get signicant until after 1970. Also, the results for
PTAs are in line with the long-term estimations from Table 1. Having a
preferential trade agreement|regional or otherwise|in common increases
the chance of being in the same trade cluster.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper investigated the variables that inuence the probability of coun-
tries being in a trade bloc. We show how trade blocs have developed through-
out 1950-2005 and determine how a number of factors|geographical, po-
litical, historical and cultural|contribute to these changes in global trade.
Distance|geodesic, cultural and cognitive|matter.
Summarizing: Distance between countries reduces the likelihood that
they belong to the same trade bloc. At the same time, countries do not have
to be strict neighbors in order to belong to the same trade cluster. However,
the negative distance coecient makes clear that even though countries do
not have to be strict neighbors, they are only likely to belong to the same
trade cluster if the distance between them is not too large. The likelihood
that countries belong to the same trade cluster decreases as their access to
sea ports becomes more challenging, while island nations tend to cluster to-
gether, since their distance to other trade partners is often relatively large.
Common language facilitates trade. Countries that used to be colonial de-
pendencies are more likely to trade with their colonizers than with other
countries. Unsurprisingly, countries that used to be colonial dependencies
of the same colonizer are more likely to trade with each other than with
other countries. Countries that used to belong to a larger predecessor tend
to continue belonging to the same trade cluster. Preferential trade agree-
ments stimulate trade cluster formation. However, visual inspection shows
strong evidence that these eorts are mainly successful at a regional level.
Our main contribution is that we signicantly expanded upon previous
datasets (compare Poon and Pandit, 1996; Poon, 1997a,b; Poon et al., 2000).
We also provide a more in-depth analysis of the factors|geographic, polit-
ical, historical and cultural|that may explain trade bloc formation over
time. Our study adds to the counter-triad argument in the international
business literature. The clustering of countries due to trade ows is geo-
graphically fascinating, since trade depends strongly on (geodesic and rela-
tive) distance. However, this study only addresses trade ows, while ignoring
the role of FDI. This is left for future research. Furthermore, adding GIS
18data on specic transaction costs (taris, complicated transportation) could
rene and improve the isolation variable a great deal. Similar, adding coun-
try information on sectoral distribution of the countries industry and rm
population level (number of MNE's and/or SME's, etc.), as well as more
sophisticated variables on culture (e.g. religious beliefs, political system,
corruption levels, just to name a few) may provide interesting complements
to our current results.
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22Appendix
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Belarus, Belgium, Belgium-Luxembourg, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
& Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslo-
vakia, D.R. Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Germany,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands,
Falkland Islands, Fiji, Finland, France, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gam-
bia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ice-
land, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mal-
dives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal,
Netherlands Antilles, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nige-
ria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Reunion, Romania, Russia,
Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia & Montenegro, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Helena, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Pierre-
Miquelon, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, USSR, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zim-
babwe.
Table A1: Countries in the dataset.
23Afghanistan-India, AFTA (ASEAN FTA), Albania-Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania-Bulgaria, Albania-
Croatia, Albania-Macedonia, Albania-Moldova, Albania-Romania, Albania-Serbia Montenegro, Andean
Community (Cartanega), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Armenia-Canada, Armenia-Cyprus, Armenia-
Estonia, Armenia-Georgia, Armenia-Iran, Armenia-Kazakhstan, Armenia-Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia-
Moldova, Armenia-Russia, Armenia-Switzerland, Armenia-Turkmenistan, Armenia-Ukraine, ASEAN-
China, Asia Pacic Trade Agreement (APTA), Association of Caribbean States (ACS), Australia-
New Zealand (ANZCERTA), Australia-Papua New Guinea (PATCRA), Australia-Singapore, Australia-
Thailand, Azerbaijan-Georgia, Azerbaijan-Ukraine, Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA), Belarus-Ukraine,
Bhutan-India, Bolivia-Chile, Bolivia-Mexico, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina-
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina-
Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Turkey, Bosnia Herzegovina and
Serbia Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina-Romania, Bulgaria-Estonia, Bulgaria-Israel, Bulgaria-Latvia,
Bulgaria-Lithuania, Bulgaria-Macedonia, Bulgaria-Moldova, Bulgaria-Serbia Montenegro, Bulgaria-Turkey,
Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica, Canada-Israel, Canada-United States (CUSFTA) (followed by NAFTA),
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), CARICOM-Colombia, CARICOM-Costa Rica, CARICOM-Cuba,
CARICOM-Dominican Republic, CARICOM-Venezuela, Central America-Mexico, Central American Com-
mon Market (CACM), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), Chile-China, Chile-Colombia,
Chile-Costa Rica, Chile-El Salvador, Chile-Guatemala, Chile-Honduras, Chile-Mexico, Chile-South Ko-
rea, Chile-Venezuela, China-Hong Kong, China-Macao, Colombia-Mexico-Venezuela, Common Economic
Zone (CEZ), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS), Community of Sahel-Sharan States (CEN-SAD), Costa Rica-Mexico, Costa
Rica-Panama, Costa Rica-Panama, Croatia-Macedonia, Croatia-Moldova, Croatia-Serbia and Montene-
gro, Croatia-Slovenia, Croatia-Turkey, Czech Republic-Estonia, Czech Republic-Israel, Czech Republic-
Latvia, Czech Republic-Lithuania, Czech Republic-Slovakia, Czech Republic-Turkey, Dominican Republic-
Panama, East African Community (EAC), EC-Algeria, EC-Chile, EC-Croatia, EC-Cyprus, EC-Egypt,
EC-Estonia, EC-Faroe Islands, EC-Iceland, EC-Israel, EC-Jordan, EC-Lebanon, EC-Macedonia, EC-
Mexico, EC-Morocco, EC-Norway, EC-Overseas Countries and Territories, EC-Russia, EC-South Africa,
EC-Switzerland-Liechtenstein, EC-Syria, EC-Tunisia, EC-Turkey, Economic and Monetary Community of
Central Africa (CEMAC) (preceded by ECCAS), Economic Community of Central African States (EC-
CAS) (followed by CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Coop-
eration Organization (ECO), EFTA, EFTA-Bulgaria, EFTA-Chile, EFTA-Croatia, EFTA-Czech Repub-
lic, EFTA-Estonia, EFTA-Hungary, EFTA-Israel, EFTA-Jordan, EFTA-Latvia, EFTA-Lithuania, EFTA-
Macedonia, EFTA-Mexico, EFTA-Morocco, EFTA-Poland, EFTA-Romania, EFTA-Singapore, EFTA-
Slovakia, EFTA-Slovenia, EFTA-Tunisia, EFTA-Turkey, Egypt-Jordan, Egypt-Turkey, El Salvador-Mexico,
El Salvador-Panama, Estonia-Faroe Islands, Estonia-Hungary, Estonia-Slovakia, Estonia-Slovenia, Estonia-
Turkey, Estonia-Ukraine, Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), European Community (EC), Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA), Faroe Islands - Norway, Faroe Islands - Switzerland, Faroe Islands-Iceland,
Faroe Islands-Poland, Georgia-Kazakhstan, Georgia-Russia, Georgia-Turkmenistan, Georgia-Ukraine,
Guatemala-Mexico, Guatemala-Panama, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Honduras-Mexico, Honduras-
Panama, Hungary-Israel, Hungary-Turkey, India-Nepal, India-Singapore, India-Sri Lanka, Israel-Mexico,
Israel-Poland, Israel-Romania, Israel-Slovakia, Israel-Slovenia, Israel-Turkey, Japan-Malaysia, Japan-
Mexico, Japan-Singapore, Jordan-Singapore, Kazakhstan-Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan-Ukraine, Kyr-
gyz Republic-Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic-Russia, Kyrgyz Republic-Ukraine, Kyrgyz Republic-Uzbekistan,
Laos-Thailand, Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Latvia-Poland, Latvia-Slovakia, Latvia-
Slovenia, Latvia-Turkey, Lithuania-Poland, Lithuania-Slovakia, Lithuania-Slovenia, Lithuania-Turkey,
Macedonia-Moldova, Macedonia-Romania, Macedonia-Slovenia, Macedonia-Turkey, Macedonia-Ukraine,
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Mercado Comn del Sur (MERCOSUR), MERCOSUR-Bolivia,
MERCOSUR-Chile, MERCOSUR-Colombia-Ecuador, MERCOSUR-Peru, MERCOSUR-SACU, Mexico-
Nicaragua, Mexico-Northern Triangle, Mexico-Uruguay, Moldova-Romania, Moldova-Serbia and Montene-
gro, Moldova-Ukraine, Morocco-Turkey, New Zealand-Singapore, New Zealand-Thailand, North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (preceded by CUSFTA), Northern Triangle, Organization of East-
ern Caribbean States (OECS), Pacic Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), Pakistan-Sri Lanka,
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA), Poland-Turkey, Romania-Serbia and Montenegro, Romania-Turkey,
Russia-Ukraine, Singapore-South Korea, Slovakia-Turkey, Slovenia-Turkey, South Asian FTA (SAFTA)
(preceded by SAPTA), South Asian PTA (SAPTA) (followed by SAFTA), South Pacic Regional Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) (followed by PACER), Southern African Customs Union
(SACU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Syria-Turkey, Tajikistan-Ukraine, Tunisia-
Turkey, Turkmenistan-Ukraine, Ukraine-Uzbekistan, US-Australia, US-Bahrain, US-Chile, US-Israel, US-
Jordan, US-Morocco, US-Singapore, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).
Table A2: Preferential trade agreements in the dataset.
24